Dear Foreign Secretary,

The Kerala International Centre (KIC) is an independent foreign policy think tank, which has been functioning in Trivandrum for nearly seven years. We have been in touch with your predecessors and we have been given some assignments for MEA's outreach programmes. Although a bit late, we would like to greet you and extend support to you in your tireless efforts to safeguard and promote India's interests abroad.

Among our members are veteran diplomats like Ambassador KPS Menon, Ambassador Thomas Abraham, former senior military officers like Lt.GenSushil Pillai and judges like Justice Hariharan Nair and academics like Dr. G.Gopakumar, the Vice-Chancellor of the Central University in Kerala. We have members from all walks of life like the armed forces, the corporate world, international relations experts, academics, civil servants and businessmen. In other words, it is a group of people interested in international relations and Indian foreign policy.

We do meet every fortnight and discuss current international issues and also listen to experts. Several Foreign Secretaries and National Security advisers have been our guests here and we hope to have you speak to us one day.

Since we are all preoccupied with a number of things, we are not able to send our considered views to the MEA and the public in writing. But we do occasionally do that when consensus breaks out among us. We recently had a number of sessions on Afghanistan and one of our active members, Brig. Suresh Nair, who had experience as a soldier and a strategist, put together India's options in Afghanistan. This was worked on by several of us and the final result of our deliberations is below. The paper analyses the various possibilities in Afghanistan and also outlines some options for India. I am sure that there is nothing new in it and given the limited access we have to hard information, we may not even have all the facts. But we are forwarding it to you in the hope that you may find some of the insights useful.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

TPS

INDIA’S AFGHANISTAN OPTIONS 

Role of US/NATO forces post 2014 in Afghanistan: Analysis

1. Though detailed plans are not public as yet, US is unlikely to completely withdraw all its troops from Afghanistan as commonly perceived, as stakes are still too high. This may be particularly true after the ISIS offensive and capture of areas in Iraq. This should caution the Americans against a troop vacuum in Afghanistan.

2. US Draw down Plan. Bilateral security agreement providing immunity for US troops has been the bone of contention between US and President Karzai. By May 2014 no agreement had been reached. On May 27, 2014 President Barack Obama announced that U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan would end in December 2014. A residual force of 9,800 troops would remain in the country, which includes a group of troops to train and advice Afghan security forces and a separate group of Special Operations forces to continue counterterrorism missions against remnants of al-Qaeda. These forces would be halved by the end of 2015, and consolidated at Bagram Air Base and in Kabul. Obama also announced that all U.S. forces, with the exception of a "normal embassy presence," would be removed from Afghanistan by the end of 2016. These remaining forces would be a regular armed forces assistance group, largely to handle military sales under the authority of the U.S. ambassador, but also guard the US embassy, train Afghan forces and support counter-terrorism operations. These troops won't exceed 1,000 troops, akin to the security presence that is currently as of May 2014 in Iraq. The president's plans were subject to the approval of the incoming Afghan government and its willingness to sign the bilateral security agreement providing immunity for U.S. troops serving in the country, which outgoing President Hamid Karzai had refused to sign.

3. From the above it is clear that the residual presence of US forces in Afghanistan may at best be able to protect Kabul and the important airfields, but would have no capability to stop any ingress by the Taliban in the outlying provinces. Thus, though there could be a degree of US presence, those will not inhibit Taliban plans, if any, for a takeover.

4. Non withdrawal by US Forces. There is another school of thought, which suggests US may not yet leave. This view gets reinforced with the present situation in Iraq. It is not the numbers of troops that matter but the objectives. What are the objectives that the US aims to achieve through this residual force? According to the official narrative, the purpose of this force is not to engage in direct combat operations, with the“exception” of supporting the counter-terrorism operations against what Obama called the “remnants of al-Qaida.” The US special operations forces are almost certain to remain in the country for that purpose. Beyond the counter-terrorism mission, the US will continue training the Afghans. As a matter of fact, according to some of the recent reports of a think-tank close to the Pentagon, the Taliban led insurgency is most likely to swell after this year’s regular troop drawdown is complete. In other words, more fighting is likely to ensue as the year ends. Would the US forces remain in their barracks during this fighting? In the wake of impending attacks, and the extremely weak position of the Afghan National Forces, it is the US forces that will be fighting the war in Afghanistan. One can easily asses the position of the Afghan forces by the fact that the simple drawdown of the US forces is likely to necessitate up to a $6bn annual commitment to Afghan security forces to make up the difference. Will the US be willing to fulfill this commitment in the wake of its economic conditions, with no major financial support from its allies forthcoming? It is clear that the US forces will directly or indirectly remain deeply entrenched in the war and will be fighting the Taliban.

5. Earlier in May, the Taliban issued a statement announcing that that they will launch their annual spring offensive, and pledged to continue fighting even if only a small number of the US forces remain in the country. The Taliban, who removed their top military commander last month, said they will focus the new offensive on foreign troops,“diplomatic centers” and contractors, as well as on members of the Afghan government and parliament, judges and officials at the foreign and interior ministries as they stay in Afghanistan government and parliament, judges and officials at the foreign and interior ministries.

6. In the 13th year of war, why didn't the Americans just follow through on their zero-option threats and pull the plug on Karzai and the war? Obviously, fear that the Taliban might gain groundin a major way after such a departure was one reason.

7. In January, New York Times reported that a paramount issue for Washington was "concerns inside the American intelligence agencies that they could lose their [Afghan] air bases used for drone strikes against al-Qaeda in Pakistan." It might, it turned out, be difficultto find other regimes in the region willing to lend bases in support of the U.S. drone campaigns in the Pakistani tribal areas and possibly Afghanistan as well.

8. The above analysis perhaps suggests that the US will still continue to play a significant role in Afghanistan, whether this is presumptuous only time will tell. However the above presumptions/options dictate the scenarios for Afghanistan vis a vis the US role.

Role of Pakistan

9. Although one does not, least of all India, need the Wiki leaks to know the surreptitious role of Pakistan, but those make it amply clear, extracts from which are given below to highlight Pakistan’s interests and thus its likely course of actions which is another key feature to future security scenario in Afghanistan.

10.Extracts from The WikiLeaks. The WikiLeaks contain documents that charge that the Pakistanis are providing both supplies and sanctuary to Taliban fighters while objecting to American forces entering Pakistan to clean out the sanctuaries and are unwilling or unable to carry out that operation by themselves (as they have continued to do in North Waziristan). Just as important, the documents charge that the ISI has continued to maintain liaison and support for the Taliban in spite of claims by the Pakistani government that pro-Taliban officers had been cleaned out of the ISI years ago. The document charges that Gul, the director-general of the ISI from 1987 to 1989, still operates in Pakistan, informally serving the ISI and helping give the ISI plausible deniability. The ISI’s relationship with the Taliban is widely known. These documents claim that this relationship remains intact.

11. Pakistan’s Strategic Interests. For Pakistan, Afghanistan is an area of fundamental strategic interest. The region’s main ethnic group, the Pashtun, stretch across the Afghan-Pakistani border. Moreover, were hostile forces present in Afghanistan, as one was during the Soviet occupation, Pakistan would face threats in the west as well as the challenge posed by India in the east. For Pakistan, an Afghanistan under Pakistani influence or at least a benign Afghanistan is a matter of overriding strategic importance. It is therefore irrational to expect the Pakistanis to halt collaboration with the force that they expect to be a major part of the government of Afghanistan when the United States leaves. The Pakistanis never expected the United States to maintain a presence in Afghanistan permanently. They understood that Afghanistan was a means toward an end, and not an end in itself. (Extracts from STRATFOR Analysis which is beyond dispute)

12. Relevance of Operations in North Waziristan. For years the Pakistan Army has shown reluctance to launch operations in North Waziristan, a territory known as a favourite rest and recreation spot for the notorious Haqqani network, which the Americans in particular find problematic. The operations launched currently by Pakistan in response to few daring terror attacks inside Pakistan including the Karachi airport could probably be a litmus test of future Pakistan intentions in Afghanistan. But the operation has still not managed to dispel the fears of those who believe the operation is more of hogwash, mainly to attract approximately $300-million — this was made conditional by the American Congress on the Army launching an attack in North Waziristan. Some suspect that this is a temporary move to avenge the deaths of soldiers in the area. The Pakistan Army’s main concern all along was to save the Haqqani network for a rainy day for a post-U.S./NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan. In the above circumstances, even with a deteriorating internal security and economic environment in Pakistan, it is unlikely to keep itself away from propping up the Taliban and attempt to form a pro Pakistan Govt in Kabul, should the right environment and opportunity exist. Pakistan is the key and therefore the scenarios that follow are more or less Pakistan oriented.

Presidential elections and its effect on Afghan stability

13. The two Presidential candidates; Abdullah, a former anti-Taliban resistance fighter, draws his support from the Tajik minority in northern Afghanistan while Ghani, a former World Bank economist, represents Pashtun tribes in the south and east of the country.
As their standoff deepens, Afghanistan has become abuzz with speculation about a broader rift along ethnic lines or even violence unless they agree to accept the outcome of the vote or come to a compromise power-sharing arrangement.

14. Ghani’s aides say he is in the lead in the run-off by at least one million votes. Abdullah, for his part, has accused President Hamid Karzai, also an ethnic Pashtun, of playing a role in the alleged rigging in Ghani’sfavour. Refusal by either Abdullah or Ghani to accept the outcome of the election would plunge the country into a dangerous crisis, with the possibility of a bloody standoff between the two ethnic groups or even secession of parts of the country. So the third important factor is the future president if any and the stability that he is likely to provide. Indian interests possibly will be best served if Abdullah comes out successful.

15. Media reports suggest that Ghani has over 56% of votes which will qualify him as the President. Though Abdullah has protested vehemently, the whole process including audit etc will be completed by end of July and the new President declared. If that process goes through smoothly, then the ambiguity on the new dispensation will be over. On the contrary if the results are declared null and void then there will be political uncertainty and will play a big role in the future scenario in Afghanistan.

16. On interaction with large numbers of Afghan refugees in Delhi under UNHCR, the refugees see Abdullah as good for them as he is anti Taliban. As mentioned earlier, Abdullah would be India’s best bet. Be that as it may, India will have to accept whoever is declared elected and cultivate good relations. Towards this, the recent Secretary of State Kerry’s initiative to resolve the impasse is an encouraging sign in that both the candidates have agreed to accept the final result declared post election audit. This could perhaps mean a stable governance in Afghanistan after Karzai’s term is over, which would greatly influence future security situations in Afghanistan post US pull out.

The transfer of power scheduled for 2 nd August 2014 did not take place and it was agreed to do it by August end after completing the audit . The audit process is not progressing well and it is not sure that the work could be completed by August end . Karzai has threatened that he will leave office by August end irrespective of the results of the audit . This could leave Afghanistan in a constitutional crisis .

Overall likely situation in Afghanistan post US withdrawal

17. Iraq Lessons. In Iraq, we are seeing what happens when there is security vacuumin the wake of US withdrawal. When Obama took office, al-Qaeda in Iraq (now the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS) was defeated militarily and ideologically. The terrorists had been driven from their safe havens, and the Sunni masses had risen up to join the United States in driving them out. Then Obama’s complete withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011 took the boot off of the terrorists’ necks — giving them space to regroup, reconstitute, retake cities and now threaten the Iraqi capital.

18. Afghanistan will be no different if Obama goes through with his withdrawal plans. The Taliban is nowhere near as defeated today as ISIS was when Obama withdrew U.S. forces from Iraq. Already the Taliban is raising its head in areas where US/NATO have withdrawn. Not only is the Taliban not militarily defeated, but it is winning the ideological struggle as well. Obama’s release of five senior Taliban leaders from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, was a shot in the arm for the Taliban — celebrated as a “great victory” by their leader, Mullah Omar. It is perhaps this victory of Taliban which prompted ISIS to bargain for the head of Journalist Foley with the release of a few accused terrorists in 9/11 incident . Finally it ended in the tragic beheading of Foley

19. If Obama withdraws, the Taliban will retake cities and territory it lost during Obama’s 2009 surge. At a bare minimum, it will restore control over large swaths of the country, and in a worst-case scenario it could take back Kabul and control the entire country. In either case, al-Qaeda will return to Afghanistan, reclaiming the safe haven it lost after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Moreover, with U.S. forces completely withdrawn, al-Qaeda will have greater freedom of movement across the border in Pakistan, because the United States cannot carry out drone strikes in Pakistan without bases in Afghanistan. (from STRATFOR Analysis, high percentage of likelihood)

Likely Scenarios

20. Within the above discussed presumptions or likely events in Afghanistan, it may be possible to paint certain specific events based scenarios on which India can plan its options and future course of actions. Some of them will need detailed deliberations and lead time to execute. This is particularly so because of India’s location vis a vis Afghanistan; with Pakistan wedged in between blocking all the land and even shortest air routes over flying Pakistan unavailable. The logistics problems will be enhanced unless planned and executed with precision. One of the aims of the Paper is to facilitate such advanced planning by India.

21. There are three key factors involved, which will dictate the likely scenarios, viz. the type of Afghan Govt, the role of residual US forces and Pakistan’s intentions. Of course Taliban and Al Qaida are also important players but their roles are constant and whose actions will be guided by the other three factors. India will have to be conscious of the fact that Afghan tribal leaders will always be powerful under any of the future scenarios in Afghanistan and it will be necessary to maintain good relations with these tribal leaders .

22. Scenario 1. A stable Afghan Govt with smooth transition of power from Karzai to the new President. US though have begun their draw down, continue with substantial presence (it is more capability based than numbers) in Afghanistan drawing in the lessons from Iraq and for the fear of Taliban’s resurgence. They maintain the ability to deal with a resurgent Taliban, if not in all the outlying provinces but in minimum to keep Kabul and all airfields secure. Drone attack capability both in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains intact. US forces will directly or indirectly remain deeply entrenched in the war and will be fighting the Taliban. Pakistan will continue their surreptitious role of pleasing the Americans for aid purposes but retaining Haqqani network intact. The policy for Pakistan will be two-tiered, consisting of overt opposition to the Taliban and covert support for the Taliban. In short this is the current scenario being extended. If this situation lasts for couple of years, the Afghan National Army (ANA) will gain that much more expertise and confidence to deal with a Taliban threat in the event of an ultimate US withdrawal. This scenario is ideal from an Indian perspective.

23. Scenario 2. A stable Afghan Govt with smooth transition of power from Karzai to the new President. Despite the situation in Iraq (which could possibly improve) US have kept to their withdrawal timetable laid down by Obama. Their role will be limited to training and advising Afghan security forces, continue counterterrorism missions against remnants of al-Qaeda through 2014-15. By the end of 2015 further draw down and consolidated at Bagram Air Base and in Kabul. A "normal embassy presence," would be left in Afghanistan by the end of 2016. These troops won't exceed 1,000. Needless to state, Taliban covertly supported by Pakistan’s military and ISI stage a comeback, first successfully taking over the countryside vacated by the US; unless provided with substantial military assistance, will soon expand their hold much like in the 90s and in a worst case situation take over Kabul by 2016/2017 or even earlier.

24. Scenario 3. The run-off between Abdullah and Ghani becomes murky. Refusal by either Abdullah or Ghani to accept the outcome of the election could plunge the country into a dangerous crisis, with the possibility of a bloody standoff between the two ethnic groups or even secession of parts of the country. This could result into an unstable political situation and if the US sticks to their withdrawal plans, then this could be the worst-case scenario. Though the political stability factor would be evident by the end of the month, for now this is a scenario to be considered. This would be the ideal situation for Pakistan to exploit the void in Afghanistan. Thus there could be a more proactive Pak involvement to prop up the Taliban. And in this worst-case scenario it could take back Kabul and control the entire country in a very quick time frame. Al-Qaeda will return to Afghanistan, reclaiming the safe haven it lost after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Moreover, with U.S. forces completely withdrawn, al-Qaeda will have greater freedom of movement across the border in Pakistan, because the United States cannot carry out drone strikes in Pakistan without bases in Afghanistan. This can be considered as doom’s day scenario.

25. Other Scenarios. There could be other scenarios which would be permutation/combination within the above three scenarios, with any one or more factors varying. In any other scenario, at a bare minimum, Taliban will have the ability to restore control over large swaths of the country. For India, situation in Kashmir will worsen with more activism of terror across the line of control with each successes of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Options for Courses of Action by India

26. India has a great stake in ensuring a Taliban free Afghanistan post US withdrawal. It has invested heavily there and a resurgence of Taliban will surely make those untenable. India will stand to lose not only its assets but also more importantly its reputation as a power to reckon with in South Asia. More importantly to ensure relative peace in Kashmir, it is essential to keep the Taliban in Afghanistan and inter alia Pakistan in check. This time around there are many others including China who has a stake in keeping the Taliban out. So India’s role will be that much more restricted but has to be substantial in effect. India cannot afford to vacillate. Well thought out strategies need to be planned and executed keeping in view the scenarios that could fan out. As mentioned earlier, the logistics involved in any likely supportive actions by India will take time due the non availability of direct access to Afghanistan. Our options could involve the following actions depending on the scenarios, though there would be many commonalties:-

a. Keeping closely engaged with the new dispensation in Kabul be it Ghani or Abdulla. All actions by India should be with the whole hearted cooperation and demands of the legitimate Govt in Afghanistan.

b. If there is a political instability, Indian activism may be necessary to remove the impasse. Our good offices with Abdullah and Karzai need to be utilized.

c. India should ensure that it is in the loop concerning plans of the future US dispensation in Afghanistan post 2014. It should not be taken by surprise at the turn of events. Afghanistan’s future and likely US posture should be important discussion points in any future Indo US dialogue at all important levels/events.

d. India should consider favorably all legitimate demands for military hardware from Afghanistan. ANA can take most of our old equipment especially that of artillery, armored vehicles, infantry weapons, vehicles, ammunition etc that India considers as the legitimate requirement to fight the Taliban. India should not shy away from this responsibility for fear of Pakistan backlash. It is now or never. We need to help ANA to stop Taliban on its heels. A resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan in all probability will encourage and support the LeT and JeM to bring Kashmir to a boil again. This could be the price Pakistan’s military would extract from the Taliban for its support in Afghanistan.

Supply of arms to Afghanistan should also result in a permanent lien for replenishment, upkeep of such equipment and supply of spares

e. Indian agencies should develop and cultivate links with all the actors in Afghanistan who are anti Taliban, much the same way it did to prop up the Northern Alliance earlier. If it can penetrate the Taliban, it will be the icing on the cake. Befriending Taliban as a pragmatic approach to garner its support to take care of Indian interests in Afghanistan as suggested in some quarters, however is not recommended.

f. An immediate security audit of all Indian assets in Afghanistan is called for. The forces required to take care of the security of the assets will vary depending on the scenarios above and should be kept in readiness. However an immediate stepping up of the security in close conjunction with Afghan security forces should be on the anvil as US starts its draw down to ensure another Kabul or Herat does not occur.

g. In case of a worst case scenario, India should plan to build up a logistic base in Iran (Chabhar port) and exploit the alternate route (Chabahar to Delaram) to Afghanistan. It should also exploit the Tajikistan option. The Farkhor Air Base which India already has in Tajikistan can be put to use by pre positioning military and other war like stores, air assets etc so that those could be made available as on requirement to the ANA.

h. From now on India should encourage all types of training for the ANA rank and file to be conducted in India or by Indian trainers in Afghanistan. Importantly its officer’s pre commission training and thereafter advanced professional courses should be conducted in India itself. This is a long term investment for cultivating the ANA in return in difficult times. Afghanistan is inclined to accept this offer from India as conveyed by Karzai during his last India visit (swearing in of PM Modi).

j. India should avoid direct military involvement in Afghanistan (boots on ground option) at all costs, though some out of area (OOA) contingencies (by Special Forces) can and should be planned for emergencies to help protect Indian assets and its nationals working there.

k. At the strategic level, India and China should frankly discuss the Afghan issue and remain deeply engaged to ensure that Afghanistan does not return to the Taliban era. There would be convergence of interests even if China has to carry along Pakistan, itsall weather ally.

l.Other countries who India should remain in constant engagement over future Afghanistan are Russia, Iran and Tajikistan.

31. The above are not exhaustive and there could be many more within the realms of Indian diplomacy/politico/military capabilities. Some of the above options will only need to be exercised in case of situation getting worse. If for example Scenario 1 is getting fanned out, India need not to do much but keep building its bilateral good relations with Afghanistan and other likeminded countries. But should other scenarios appear likely, then other difficult options need to be exercised with precision and mature state craft.

32. The Paper outlines the contours of an Afghanistan post US withdrawal, it is very difficult to predict with any degree of certainty what situations will emerge there, just as the ISIS rapid advance into Iraq took the World by surprise. However Afghanistan is too close to Indian interests to ignore and it would be prudent for India to begin to outline its strategy in dealing with a post US Afghanistan right now. Already India has suspended its flights to Kabul after the attack on the airport, which incidentally killed two Indians (Keralites) working for a US security firm. If situation gets worse communication channels will get closed, hence planning from now on our Afghanistan options is important if we are not be caught wanting in a crunch situation. Lastly, though a strong case and support exists for India to abandon Afghanistan should situation become adverse, that would be foolhardy and playing into Pakistan’s interests and will lead to a worsening situation in Jammu and Kashmir.

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